Wikileaks and the Protect-IP Act: A New Public-Private Threat to the Internet Commons by Benkler, Yochai
Wikileaks and the Protect-
IP Act: A New Public-Private
Threat to the Internet Commons
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Yochai Benkler, WikiLeaks and the PROTECT-IP Act: A New Public-
Private Threat to the Internet Commons, 140 Daedalus 154 (2011).
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:37078735
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions




WikiLeaks and the protect-ipAct: 
A New Public-Private Threat to the 
Internet Commons
Yochai Benkler
© 2011 by Yochai Benkler
YOCHAIBENKLER is the Berkman
Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal
Studies at Harvard University,
where he also serves as Faculty Co-
director of the Berkman Center for
Internet and Society. His publica-
tions include “The Commons as 
a Neglected Factor of Information
Policy,” Telecommunications Pol-
icy Research Conference (1998);
“From Consumers to Users: Shift-
ing the Deeper Structures of Regu-
lation Toward Sustainable Com-
mons and User Access,” Federal
Communications Law Journal (2000);
and The Wealth of Networks: How
Social Production Transforms Markets
and Freedom (2006).
In December 2010, a website that the Pentagon had
described in 2008 as dedicated “to expos[ing] un-
ethical practices, illegal behavior, and wrongdoing
within corrupt corporations and oppressive regimes
in Asia, the former Soviet bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Middle East,” and that in 2009 had received
the Amnesty International New Media Award for
reporting on extrajudicial killings in Kenya, came
under a multisystem denial-of-service attack in-
tended to prevent it from disseminating informa-
tion. The attacks combined a large-scale technical
distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack with
new patterns of attack aimed to deny Domain Name
System (dns) service and cloud-storage facilities,
disrupt payment systems services, and disable an
iPhone app designed to display the site’s content. 
The site was WikiLeaks. The attackers ranged from
unidenti½ed DDoS attackers to Senator Joseph
Lieberman and, more opaquely, the Obama admin-
Abstract: The WikiLeaks affair and proposed copyright bills introduced in the Senate are evidence of a
new, extralegal path of attack aimed at preventing access and disrupting the payment systems and adver-
tising of targeted sites. In this model, the attacker may be a government agency seeking to circumvent
constitutional constraints on its power or a private company trying to enforce its interests beyond those
afforded by procedural or substantive safeguards in the law. The vector of attack runs through the tar-
geted site’s critical service providers, disrupting technical services, such as Domain Name System service,
cloud storage, or search capabilities; and business-related services, such as payment systems or advertising.
The characteristics that make this type of attack new are that it targets an entire site, rather than aiming
for removal or exclusion of speci½c offending materials; operates through denial of business and ½nan-
cial systems, in addition to targeting technical systems; and systematically harnesses extralegal pressure
to achieve results beyond what law would provide or even permit.
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istration. The latter attack is of particular
interest here, having entailed an extra-
legal public-private partnership between
politicians gunning to limit access to the
site, functioning in a state constrained by
the First Amendment, and private ½rms
offering critical functionalities to the
site–dns, cloud storage, and payments,
in particular–that were not similarly
constrained by law from denying service
to the offending site. The mechanism cou-
pled a legally insuf½cient but publicly sa-
lient insinuation of illegality and danger-
ousness with a legal void. By publicly stat-
ing or implying that WikiLeaks had acted
unlawfully, the attackers pressured ½rms
skittish about their public image to cut off
their services to WikiLeaks. The inapplica-
bility of constitutional constraints to non-
state actors created the legal void, per-
mitting ½rms to deny services to Wiki-
Leaks. This, in turn, allowed them to ob-
tain results (for the state) that the state is
prohibited by law from pursuing directly.
The range of systems affected by the attack
was also new: in addition to disrupting
technical service providers–which had
been familiar targets since efforts to con-
trol the Net began in the 1990s–the attack
expanded to include payment systems. 
This pattern of attack is not an aberra-
tion. One need only observe its similari-
ties to current efforts by the copyright in-
dustries to shut down sites that challenge
their business models. This objective was
laid out most explicitly in the ½rst draft of
the Combating Online Infringements
and Counterfeits Act (coica)1 that was
introduced in September 2010, and a pow-
erful version of it remains in the present
version of the bill, the Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity
and Theft of Intellectual Property Act
(protect-ip Act) of 2011.2 The coica/
protect-ip approach, which replicates
the dynamics of the WikiLeaks attack, en-
deavors to create a relatively procedure-
free context for designating sites as legal-
ly suspect actors, while making critical ser-
vice providers immune from responsibil-
ity for any action they take by denying
technical, payment, and business process
systems to targeted sites. Together, these
elements form the basis for extralegal
attacks on critical services, thereby creat-
ing a shortcut to shutting down allegedly
offending sites. The insinuation of illegal-
ity creates the basis for public pressure on
the service providers to deny service; im-
munity replicates the legal void that allows
service-provider action well beyond any-
thing a court would have ordered. 
Combining denial-of-payment systems
with the use of extrajudicial mechanisms
and private party enforcement appears to
extend basic techniques developed in the
war on terrorism into the civilian domain.
It represents a new threat not only to the
networked commons, but to the very
foundations of the rule of law in the Unit-
ed States. 
On November 28, 2010, WikiLeaks, in
cooperation with The New York Times, the
Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El País,
began to release a set of leaked U.S. em-
bassy cables. The following is a condensed
version of a detailed and fully document-
ed event study of the response to that dis-
closure.3 WikiLeaks, a site dedicated to
making materials leaked by whistleblow-
ers public, had published a series of items
from the Pentagon and the State Depart-
ment between April and November 2010.
The ½rst release, a video showing Ameri-
can helicopters shooting a Reuters pho-
tographer and his driver, exposed previ-
ously hidden collateral damage incurred
in the pursuit of insurgents. The video was
followed by the release of thousands of war
logs in which ½eld commanders described
conditions on the ground in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The disclosures were initially de-
scribed by the administration as highly
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damaging to the security of troops and
human rights workers, but as time passed,
formal Pentagon assessments sent to
Congress suggested that no such harm
had occurred.4 On November 28, Wiki-
Leaks and its traditional-media partners
began to release documents selected from
a cache of about 250,000 classi½ed cables
that U.S. embassies around the world had
sent to the State Department. In late No-
vember and December they published, 
in redacted form, a few hundred of these
cables. WikiLeaks’s decision to publish the
materials, including when and how they
were published, was protected by First
Amendment law. Indeed, precedents es-
tablished at least as far back as the Pen-
tagon Papers case support the proposition
that a U.S. court would not have ordered
removal or suppression of the documents,
nor would it have accepted a criminal pros-
ecution of WikiLeaks or any of its editors
and writers.5
Despite the constitutional privilege that
allowed WikiLeaks to publish the leaked
documents, American political ½gures
widely denounced the disclosures. More-
over, critics appeared to blame only Wiki-
Leaks, even though traditional outlets such
as The New York Times were providing ac-
cess to the same cables, and in the same
form. The most effective critic, Chairman
of the Senate Homeland Security Com-
mittee Senator Joseph Lieberman, urged
companies providing services to Wiki-
Leaks to cease doing so. Senator Lieber-
man issued his call on December 1, 2010,
following a well-crafted letter from the
State Department to WikiLeaks sent No-
vember 27, 2010. That letter did not take
the legally indefensible position that Wiki-
Leaks itself had broken the law. Instead,
it correctly asserted that the law had been
broken (by someone), insinuating that
WikiLeaks was the offending party. Not
surprisingly, implicated service providers
were among those who misread the let-
ter. In a critical move, PayPal discontin-
ued its service to WikiLeaks; a vice pres-
ident of the ½rm, commenting publicly,
pointed to the November 27 letter, not to
Senator Lieberman’s call, as the reason
that PayPal believed WikiLeaks had bro-
ken the law, thus triggering the ½rm’s de-
cision to stop payment service to Wiki-
Leaks.6 The State Department letter was
complemented by a series of public state-
ments that tried to frame WikiLeaks’s em-
bassy cable release as international ter-
rorism. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
called the release of the cables “an attack
on the international community.” Vice
President Joseph Biden explicitly stated
that Julian Assange, the founder of Wiki-
Leaks, was “more like a high-tech terror-
ist than the Pentagon Papers.” Senator
Dianne Feinstein wrote a Wall Street Jour-
nal editorial calling for Assange’s pros-
ecution under the Espionage Act. Some
right-wing politicians simply called for
his assassination on the model of U.S.
targeted killings against Taliban and Al
Qaeda leaders.7
Against the backdrop of this massive
public campaign against WikiLeaks, Sen-
ator Lieberman’s December 1 public ap-
peal was immediately followed by a series
of service denials:
• December 1: Storage. Amazon removes
WikiLeaks materials from its cloud-
storage facility.
–Countermeasure: WikiLeaks moves stor-
age to ovh in France.
• December 2: DNS. Everydns, the dns
registrar serving the WikiLeaks.org do-
main, stops pointing the domain name
to WikiLeaks’s server.
–Countermeasure: WikiLeaks uses nu-
meric ip addresses updated through
Twitter and begins to rely more heav-
ily on WikiLeaks.ch dns as well as 
on mirroring by various volunteers
throughout the Net.
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• December 3, 5: Storage. French Minister
of Industry Eric Besson calls on ovh to
cease providing storage; by December 5,
ovh removes WikiLeaks content.
–Countermeasure: WikiLeaks moves
again, to Sweden, initially to the serv-
ers of the Pirate Party, a Swedish polit-
ical party, and later to a Swedish stor-
age provider.
• December 4: Payment systems. PayPal 
stops processing donations for Wiki-
Leaks,cutting off a major source of fund-
ing. A vice president of PayPal points to 
the State Department’s November 27 let-
ter to WikiLeaks as the reason PayPal 
concluded that WikiLeaks was acting 
illegally and terminated service.
–Countermeasure: No effective response.
WikiLeaks loses substantial revenue as
PayPal ceases to process donations.
Loss of revenue continues with the
credit card stoppages that follow.
• December 6: Payment systems. MasterCard
stops servicing WikiLeaks. The Swiss
Postal Bank closes Julian Assange’s per-
sonal account with the Swiss bank for his
failure to provide an adequate address.
• December 7: Payment systems. Visa joins
MasterCard. Bank of America discontin-
ues services ten days later.
• December 20: App store. Apple removes a
third-party app created to allow iPhone
users to access and search WikiLeaks
embassy cables.
–Countermeasure: WikiLeaks has no
possible recourse. However, apps for 
the Android smartphone were not re-
moved.
None of these companies was compelled
by legal order to deny services to Wiki-
Leaks. Indeed, under First Amendment
law, it would have been impossible for the
government or anyone else to obtain such
an order. That aspect of U.S. constitutional
law justi½es describing this set of events
as an attack on WikiLeaks. Put differently,
the service denials to WikiLeaks were the
result of an effort by the government to
shut down the site irrespective of the fact
that the law prohibited the government
from doing so. In private conversations, in-
dividuals within and close to the admin-
istration emphatically denied any back-
channel communications threatening or
cajoling the companies. These claims seem
plausible, and for purposes of analysis
here, I consider them to be true. My claim,
however, is based not on intent or the like-
lihood of conspiracy, but on effect. A pub-
lic media campaign against WikiLeaks, led
by top administration ½gures and some of
the most senior politicians in the presi-
dent’s party, triggered vigilante actions by
corporations that, unfettered by the laws
constraining public-sector responses, like-
ly saw themselves as acting in the nation-
al interest as they degraded the site’s ca-
pabilities. Regardless of how its actions
were perceived, WikiLeaks was engaged
in classic fourth-estate functions at the
core of freedom-of-the-press protections.
In order to guard against similar outcomes
in the future, it is important to understand
and correctly characterize the events
against the site as an attack on an impor-
tant practice in the networked commons.
From a technical perspective, the attack
was largely unsuccessful. The site proved
enormously robust, using the core modes
of networked resilience, namely, redun-
dancy and decentralized cooperation.
When WikiLeaks.org was denied dns ser-
vice, the site used a range of numeric ip
addresses circulated on blogs and Twitter.
It moved through a series of non-U.S.
domains, the most important of which
was the Swiss domain name WikiLeaks.ch.
The Swiss dns service provider, Switch,
refused to capitulate to pressures to cease
service to WikiLeaks. When cloud storage
was denied in the United States, the site
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moved ½rst to France, where service was
again denied under pressure from the
French government, and then to Sweden.
Moreover, thousands of mirror sites
sprang up to permit access to the docu-
ments that had been released up to that
point. However, where the system was not
Internet based, as in the case of the iPhone
app, it was impossible to replace. Nonethe-
less, the relative insigni½cance of the app,
as long as an open Internet alternative ex-
isted, minimized the importance of that
pathway. However, the fact that the Wiki-
Leaks app was not easily replaceable pro-
vides an important indication of how vul-
nerable information is when available only
over an iPhone or iPad-accessed network;
the open Internet, by contrast, is robust. 
Targeting WikiLeaks’s business sys-
tems proved much more successful as a
line of attack. WikiLeaks, which depends
on donations from supporters to fund its
operations, apparently lost 80 to 90 per-
cent of its revenue stream in the ½rst two
months of the attack, and only gradually
was able to create a set of proxies for re-
ceiving donations.8 As was the case with
the iPhone app, in the absence of a com-
petitive market to offer signi½cant redun-
dant pathways for payment systems, per-
suading two or three companies to deny
service was suf½cient to severely hamper
the site’s payment operations. Whether 
a targeted site is a nonpro½t dependent
on donations or a for-pro½t or low-pro½t
enterprise funded by transactions or ad-
vertising, an attack on the business sys-
tems a site depends on for ½nancing ap-
pears harder to avert. This particular attack
on payment systems seems to derive from
the war-on-terror rhetoric applied to Wiki-
Leaks as well as from a decade-old program
established to compel payment and ½nan-
cial services ½rms to shut off funds flow-
ing to terrorist organizations.9
The attack on WikiLeaks largely failed
to achieve its goals. If it was aimed to pre-
vent people around the world from ac-
cessing the leaked materials, it failed. The
materials were made available on both
distributed mirror sites and the sites of
traditional media partners, whose public
visibility seems to have made them invul-
nerable to the kind of informal, extra-
legal pressure that worked to deny service
to WikiLeaks. If it was aimed to discredit
the reports, it clearly failed here because
WikiLeaks’s partnership with traditional
media helped raise visibility and add cred-
ibility to the documents. The technical as-
pect of the attack failed almost entirely:
redundancy and the ability to move from
one country to another allowed for robust
storage, and the creation of thousands of
mirror sites by individuals around the
world made DDoS and dns attacks inef-
fective. 
Moreover, not all ½rms folded as easily
as Amazon, PayPal, MasterCard, and Visa.
Refusing to follow the U.S.-based Every-
dns, the Swiss dns registrar continued
to point to WikiLeaks.ch. Twitter declined
to respond to document requests until sub-
ject to subpoena. Google did not remove
related apps from the Android system or
drop WikiLeaks results from its search
engine. The success of an attack that relies
on public pressure and a legal void in
which to act depends on service provid-
ers’ concern about being perceived as help-
ing the targeted site; this concern must
outweigh the providers’ interest in main-
taining their image as providers of robust,
incorruptible services to the Internet-
using public. Thus, the new form of in-
formal, extralegal attack can be only par-
tially effective if not all service providers
are on board. Nonetheless, the denial of
payment systems greatly affected Wiki-
Leaks’s cash flow and was likely the 
most effective and dangerous aspect of
the attack. 
This new pattern of attack (a) targeted
an entire site; (b) was carried out through
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denial of service by commercial service
providers of critical technical and busi-
ness capabilities; and (c) circumvented
constitutional protections by creating an
extralegal public-private partnership for
censorship, using the inapplicability of
constitutional limitations to private com-
panies together with the relatively loose
regulation of the standard-form contracts
that govern the relations between service
providers and their customers. 
The WikiLeaks affair might properly
have been dismissed as a one-off set of
events if not for a similarly structured at-
tack at the center of copyright legislation
introduced in the Senate since late 2010.
The protect-ip Act is the most recent
iteration of the U.S. copyright industries’
seventeen-year-long drive to enlist vari-
ous intermediaries and service providers
of networked facilities to enforce their
rights through law and public policy.10
Beginning in the Clinton White House
with a 1995 white paper11 and culminat-
ing with the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (dmca) of 1998,12 the indus-
tries sought to create a set of liabilities
that would lead Internet service provid-
ers (isps) and Web-hosting companies to
remove infringing materials. The safe
harbor notice and takedown procedures
adopted in the dmca represented the set-
tlement of the ½rst half-decade of policy-
making in this ½eld. Under these provi-
sions, pure telecommunications carriers
were excluded from the requirements of
policing content. Providers of caching,
Web-hosting, and search engines and
Web directories were required to have a
procedure in place for receiving notices
regarding speci½c offending materials, and
for taking down those materials; but they
were not required to search out such con-
tent themselves or to block entire sites. 
The following decade witnessed a leg-
islative stalemate. On the one hand, the
content industries hoped to expand con-
trol over materials on the Net in order to
preserve and increase their revenues. On
the other hand, a coalition of computer,
software, and communications business-
es that pro½ted from the free flow of
information and cultural goods online,
together with civil society organizations
aiming to preserve a space for a cultural
commons, was concerned that efforts to
impose controls would hamper the open,
creative, participatory structure of the net-
worked environment. While Republicans
seemed less responsive to pressures from
Hollywood, since 2006, Democrats con-
trolling the Senate have pushed through a
slate of laws designed to implement the
Motion Picture Association of America’s
long-standing agenda. Most pertinent are
the Prioritizing Resources and Organiza-
tion for Intellectual Property Act (pro-ip
Act) of 2008, which created an ip czar in
the White House and funded additional
resources for criminal copyright enforce-
ment,13 and provisions in the Higher Edu-
cation Opportunity Act of 200814 that re-
quired colleges to redesign their networks
and develop offerings to protect the
interests of Hollywood and the recording
industry against their students. These laws
include the two main elements of the bills
currently under consideration: that is, they
expanded the involvement of criminal en-
forcement authorities in what was tradi-
tionally an area of private commercial law,
and they used state leverage to harness
private platform providers to enforce the
interests of the copyright industries. 
Unlike the settlement of the 1990s, the
most recent set of bills targets not offend-
ing content, but offending sites. While the
dmca focused on speci½c documents that
violated copyright, new legislation–in the
same vein as the WikiLeaks case–seeks
to take out entire sites, speci½cally those
de½ned as primarily dedicated to unau-
thorized distribution of copyrighted ma-
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terials. It also substantially expands the
set of addressees who are enlisted to aid
the content industries. In addition to car-
riers, caching providers, and Web-host-
ing companies (which, in today’s incar-
nation, cover cloud-storage facilities), the
new bills cover dns providers, advertis-
ing providers, and payment systems such
as PayPal or credit card companies. From
a procedural standpoint, the newest bills
combine elaborate procedures that would
allow a court order against sites or domain
names not subject to U.S. jurisdiction,
with subtle efforts to harness and formal-
ize the extralegal public-private partner-
ship exhibited in the WikiLeaks affair. 
Introduced in September 2010 as the
½rst bill in this series, coica clearly iden-
ti½ed its target as sites that have “no de-
monstrably commercially signi½cant pur-
pose” other than providing access through
downloading, streaming, or linking to un-
authorized materials. The breadth of the
de½nition, however, captures much more,
including “providing access to any goods
or services in violation of the Copyright
Act” or enabling a violation. The more
tightly de½ned target is only an example of
this broader set. For instance, the broad-
er de½nition would include a creative site
dedicated to anime music videos that pro-
vides the underlying songs, as is so often
the case with the genre, in full or in sub-
stantial part–even though the work is
transformative. The breadth of coverage
becomes clearer when considering the
blacklist described below; developed by a
copyright industry ½rm in June 2011, the
list included Archive.org and distribution
of basic technical tools such as BitTor-
rent. Here, my point is not to challenge
the de½nition, but to outline the method
of attack on sites targeted under the pro-
posed law. coica empowers the Attor-
ney General–the same government divi-
sion that the 2008 legislation bolstered–
to enforce copyright through criminal law.
If the Department of Justice determines
that a given domain name is associated
with a site that falls under coica’s de½-
nition of unlawful behavior, it can peti-
tion for a court order that would obligate
dns providers in the United States to
stop resolving the domain; or, if the do-
main is registered with a dns provider
used by U.S. customers but not subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, any U.S. service provid-
er, isps in particular, is required to take
reasonable measures to prevent the do-
main name from resolving to the offend-
ing site. Moreover, “½nancial transaction
providers” are required to cease servicing
the site and enforce their copyrights to
prevent the site from using their logos.
Finally, contextual advertising providers
are required to stop serving ads to the site.
The innovations embedded in coica, rel-
ative to prior legislation, are (a) the in-
troduction of a broad-based attack at the
site level, rather than removal of discrete
documents, and (b) the harnessing of pay-
ment systems and advertising to deny eco-
nomic viability to the site. In this sense,
coica presaged the attack on WikiLeaks
through the payment system.
Another element of the original coica
was its particularly crisp platform for
extrajudicial enforcement. Although the
original has since been abandoned in fa-
vor of more subtle versions, the original
form crystallizes the intent of the later
versions. In its initial form, coica re-
quired the Attorney General to “maintain
a public listing of domain names that,
upon information and reasonable belief,
the Department of Justice determines are
dedicated to infringing activities but for
which the Attorney General has not ½led
an action under this section.” The thresh-
old for designation as an offending site is
extremely low: the Department of Justice
simply must allege “upon information
and reasonable belief” that a site is dedi-
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cated to infringing activities. This provi-
sion invokes standard language used in
litigation to indicate the minimum level
of knowledge required for plaintiffs to
sustain a complaint without subjecting
themselves to sanctions; it suggests a
generalized suspicion more than a real
investigation. Once a site is blacklisted,
dns service providers, isps, payment sys-
tem providers, and advertising providers
are immunized from liability if they deny
service to the site listed as offending.
Note that the technique employed here
is similar to the one utilized in the attack
on WikiLeaks. The evidentiary threshold
for state designation of a “bad actor” is
well below what would be necessary to
obtain judicial approval of that actor’s
“badness.” For this reason, the statute
cannot demand that private third parties
comply with the enforcement efforts.
Nonetheless, this substandard designa-
tion of bad-actor status can be used to
pressure private service providers into
acquiescence. By combining the extra-
judicial designation with immunity for
½rms that discontinue service to the tar-
geted sites, the state increases the likeli-
hood that private parties will comply.
The promise of immunity both expresses
the state’s expectation that cooperative
private providers will, in fact, act against
the designated entities and minimizes
the risk and cost of doing so. The immu-
nity creates the legal void necessary for
vigilante enforcement and shows that
such actions are desirable to the state. By
contrast, the targeted site owner’s de-
fense becomes expensive. The procedure
proposed would not create a legal black
hole: the Attorney General was required
to create mechanisms for allowing site
owners to challenge their blacklisting
and to appeal an unfavorable decision 
to a reviewing court. But the process re-
verses the normal presumptions of inno-
cence. The “bad actors” blacklist, coupled
with immunity, allows the state to place
substantial pressure on sites deemed of-
fending without obtaining a judicial deter-
mination prior to triggering the attack. 
What makes this form of attack so wor-
risome? Ultimately, cases will be subject
to judicial review, and if the court rules
that the closure is unjusti½ed, it will be
lifted. The problem is that this procedure
allows for effective elimination of reve-
nues and technical access for lengthy pe-
riods pending review. Because there is no
speci½c order or process prior to black-
listing, a site can ½nd itself technically in-
accessible and unable to use payment sys-
tems or advertising. Unless a site can im-
mediately reestablish a backup presence
–that is, use the redundancy of multiple
sites–it will likely be economically dead
by the time it can challenge the listing. 
In combination, coica expands the
vectors of attack to include payment sys-
tems and advertising networks and pro-
vides an extralegal avenue of attack with-
out prior judicial approval that can be
sustained for an unspeci½ed period while
administrative and judicial appeals are
pending. These elements largely, though
not completely, enable the state to cir-
cumvent or severely curtail the require-
ments of legality and the protections of
procedure. 
The Senate abandoned this explicit
entanglement of the state in extralegal en-
forcement. The procedure was replaced by
an immunity provision that created space
for private enforcement of the multi-
system attack. In the revised bill, the pro-
vision simply states: “No domain name
registry, domain name registrar, ½nancial
transaction provider, or service that pro-
vides advertisements to Internet sites
shall be liable to any person on account of
any action described in this section vol-
untarily taken if the entity reasonably be-
lieves the Internet site is dedicated to
infringing activities.” The promise of
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immunity creates a legal space for infor-
mal pressures on advertising and ½nan-
cial services ½rms to deny services to
potentially offending sites. It effectively
invites private entities to create blacklists
of their own. Similar to the reasonable
belief envisioned in the original coica
bill, those lists could provide the justi-
½cation for blocking targeted sites. 
The current draft of the protect-ip
Act replicates this latter approach. It ex-
pands on coica by (a) creating a private
right of action, which gives the copyright
industries the power to initiate and en-
force the attacks and (b) making the im-
munity provision applicable with regard
to any site accused, rather than only non-
U.S. sites, as was the case in coica. Sec-
tion 5 of the protect-ip Act immunizes
any service provider that in “good faith
and based on credible evidence has a rea-
sonable belief that the Internet site is an
Internet site dedicated to infringing activ-
ities.” This weak standard encourages the
creation of industry-maintained black-
lists to implicate sites allegedly engaged
in offending activities. In turn, the legal
immunity creates the perfect context for
putting pressure on private infrastructure,
payment systems, and advertising pro-
viders to deny service to the blacklisted
sites. Not surprisingly, in June 2011, less
than a month after publication of the most
recent iteration of this type of immunity,
the advertising ½rm GroupM, whose cli-
ents include Universal Music, Paramount,
and Warner Bros., developed a blacklist
of more than two thousand sites to which
it would not serve ads.15 The list report-
edly includes sites that indeed appear to
provide primarily illegal downloads as
well as sites whose practices are clearly
non-offending, such as Archive.org and a
broad range of basic technology sites that
could, in principle, be used for ½le shar-
ing.16 Reliance on such a list is unlikely to
fail the “good faith and based on credible
evidence” test of “reasonable belief” set
out in the protect-ip Act. This makes
the blacklist, however imperfect, a base
from which to launch an extrajudicial at-
tack on payment systems, contextual ad-
vertising, dns, and other technical servic-
es of these sites, entirely circumventing
the procedural and substantive protec-
tions embedded in the Copyright Act and
the federal rules of civil procedure.
The years 2010 and 2011 have witnessed
the introduction of a new pattern of at-
tack on controversial websites, one that
involves both the state and major private
actors in a public-private partnership
formed to suppress offending content.
WikiLeaks publishes content that is of
primary concern to the state; the suppres-
sion of such content is prohibited by the
First Amendment. The attack on the site
sought to circumvent constitutional pro-
tections by applying informal pressure
(which is not reviewable under the Con-
stitution) to private actors (who were not
subject to constitutional constraints) to
further the state’s objective of suppress-
ing the publication of the materials in
question. protect-ip represents the in-
verse of this public-private partnership for
censorship. Here, the interests are those
of certain segments of the business com-
munity–the copyright industries–seek-
ing to use the state to help harness other
private actors to enforce their interests. 
The elements common to both methods
of attack are the denial of business and
technical systems and the use of extra-
legal or very weakly legally constrained
forms to designate the target of attack
and to de½ne the pattern of denial of ser-
vice. The effect is to dispense with, or at
least limit, the procedural and substan-
tive protections afforded to targeted sites,
and to degrade, if not completely pre-
vent, the operations of the organizations
that use the site. All this is achieved with
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practically no need for judicial approval
before the action, and with only relative-
ly expensive and slow judicial review while
the attack is ongoing. 
The features of the attack are eerily
familiar. They are the common charac-
teristics of what was described as early 
as September 24, 2001, as “the ½nancial
front in the Global War on Terrorism.”17
The coica model for designating bad
actors to be blocked by private parties
replicates the model developed in 2001
that allowed the Treasury Department to
designate “blocked persons,” a label that
triggers obligations by banks and others
to freeze assets and deny further use of
payment systems. Administrative desig-
nation without need for judicial order, or
weak-to-nonexistent procedural protec-
tion for targets, combined with the use of
private business systems providers to
execute the goals of the state is rooted in
the model developed for the “war on ter-
ror” of the ½rst decade of the 2000s. This
model now appears to be introducing
two new elements into much more mun-
dane areas of social policy and organiza-
tion. The ½rst is the use of extrajudicial
models for designating targets for attack.
The second is harnessing private actors,
in particular business and ½nancial sys-
tems providers, to choke off fund flows
to suspected organizations. Setting aside
debates over whether those elements can
be justi½ed when the targets are suspected
terrorist organizations, observing them
metastasize to the civilian part of normal
political and economic life in a democrat-
ic, networked society is extremely trou-
bling and should be resisted–politically,
legally, and technically.
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